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Abstract: One of the main controversial aspects of sustainability metrics relies on the accuracy,
transparency, and reliability of the information at the basis of environmental, social and governance
(ESG) scores. This paper investigates whether firms that have their ESG reporting audited by
independent firms exhibit a higher quality of ESG scores. We performed an analysis investigating
the change in ESG scores following the unveiling of a corporate misconduct. We documented that,
overall, no significant ESG score adjustment occurs after the scandal becomes public, thus, implying
that rating agencies provide an accurate interpretation of the firm’s sustainability. However, our results
differed when we distinguished between audited and unaudited reports. Firms whose reports are
audited by third parties did not exhibit significant changes in their scores after a scandal, whereas for
companies whose reports are not audited, we detected a worsening of the ESG scores that are
statistically significant. Our findings were also confirmed in a multivariate analysis. Overall, our results
suggest that the reliability of ESG scores can benefit from the auditing of sustainability reporting by
third parties, which has an assurance effect on the quality of the company’s ESG information.
Keywords: ESG scores; audit; ESG reports; ESG transparency; non-financial reporting audit;
corporate scandals
1. Introduction
The key indicators of a firm’s non-financial performance play an increasing role in capital markets
beyond traditional metrics [1]. Advocates of the use of non-financial information see it as a way to
align managerial incentives with long-term shareholders’ value creation, and, ultimately, with the
creation of social value [2].
The plethora of environmental, social and governance (ESG) indicators and the investors’ need
for their assessment and scrutiny have created demand for specialized rating services. ESG rating
agencies play a valuation role by disseminating information to market participants, analogous to credit
rating providers. In this role, ESG rating agencies gather and analyze the information relevant for
assessing environmental, social, and governance quality, and make the results of their analyses available
to investors and other stakeholders [3,4]. Since there is no unique definition of ESG performance,
an important role they perform is to provide an interpretation of the company’s ESG practices
and results.
One of the main controversial aspects of sustainability metrics relies on the accuracy, transparency,
and reliability of the information that is at the basis of the scores. Normally, evaluations by ESG rating
agencies are made using complex questionnaires and an analysis of public information sources [5].
The primary source of rating agencies’ information relies on the reporting issued by companies.
Where financial reporting has reached standardized forms at an international level, non-financial
reporting is still in its infancy. This exposes the ESG information released by companies to varying
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degrees of accuracy, which can ultimately impact the reliability of ESG scores. Indeed, if the information
that rating agencies receive from companies is noisy at best, the released scores will be also.
The information asymmetry between companies and market participants can be mitigated in the
presence of external verification. Third-party assurance about the quality of management’s reporting
has the potential to increase the credibility of voluntary disclosures [6]. Research has documented that
an increasing number of firms seek external expertise to verify the information included in non-financial
reporting [7–10]. For example, using a sample of large multinational corporations, Perego and Kolk [8]
found that the proportion of firms having their sustainability reports audited increased from 21.4% in
1999 to 55.8% in 2008.
Previous work has also shown that an assurance of sustainability information increases
stakeholders’ perception of the reliability of ESG reporting and that the demand for assurance
services is affected by country, as well as firms’ specific factors [11]. However, there is no evidence,
to our knowledge, on the impact that audited non-financial reporting can have on the quality of
sustainability assessments by raters.
In this paper, we intend to fill this gap and explore whether auditing on sustainability reporting
can play a meaningful role in improving the reliability of ESG scores. To do so, we rely on corporate
scandals, as in [12–14]. Corporate controversies are publicly observable events that are expected
to have negative implications on the firm, as they put its reputation at risk, undermine the trust of
stakeholders into the company, and can seriously damage its environmental, social, and governmental
sustainability. Focusing on such negative news that usually come as a surprise allows the changes that
occur in ESG scores at instances during which market participants revise their beliefs about a firm’s
sustainability performance and policies to be detected.
We first explore whether the detection of corporate wrongdoing affects the ESG rating by analyzing
the change that occurs in ESG scores after the scandal has become public information. A reliable measure
of ESG performance should be capable of conveying information about the future sustainability of
a company before the scandal is revealed. Therefore, if the ESG rating is of good quality, we expect no
significant change in the ESG score at the uncovering of corporate misconduct.
We next assess whether the change in ESG rating at the unveiling of corporate misconduct is
affected by the underlying quality of the reported data. If the audit is valuable for ESG company
reporting, we expect that the change in ESG scores worsens for firms whose sustainability reports
are unaudited.
Our results reveal that the change in ESG scores, which takes place when a controversy is
brought to public attention, is not significantly affected by the negative event. Therefore, on average,
the score revision is not impacted by the scandal, which can be interpreted as good news for
the quality of ESG scores, as rating agencies provide an accurate interpretation of the firm’s
sustainability. However, our results differ when we distinguish between audited and unaudited
reports. Firms whose reports are audited by third parties do not exhibit significant changes in their
scores after a scandal, whereas for companies whose reports are not audited, we detect a worsening of
their ESG performance that is statistically significant. Our findings are also confirmed in a multivariate
analysis. Overall, our results suggest that the reliability of an ESG rating can benefit from the auditing
of sustainability reporting by third parties, which have an assurance effect on the quality of a company’s
ESG information.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the quality of ESG data and the reliability of ESG scores.
The issue of whether ESG data can accurately reveal a firm’s non-financial performance is of primary
importance. Not only does the quality of data have key implications for rating agencies, but also
for investors, companies, and researchers. When ESG metrics capture a firm’s performance on ESG
issues as accurately as possible, then investors can incorporate the data into their business analysis and
valuation tools; companies are able to integrate their sustainability efforts into their operating processes
and investment strategies; researchers will be more effective in detecting relationships between ESG
metrics and financial performance [15–21].
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Our research has also policy implications. There is a mounting debate on the need for more
reliable non-financial information. The actual context mostly relies on voluntary disclosure, as there
are no generally accepted information framework or reporting standards. This turns out to be an
obstacle to the consistency of the reporting and comparison of ESG performance across companies at
least within the same industry. Regulatory initiatives (such as the Directive 2014/95/EU adopted by the
European Union) are increasing and the findings of our paper can help in facilitating a discussion on
the challenges that the quality of ESG data poses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the related
literature. Section 3 presents the sample, data, and the model. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
focuses on robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. Section 7 discusses the limitations of the data.
2. Literature Review
Equity investors put a lot of effort into seeking investment opportunities where positive ESG
factors signal future growth [22]. Equity analysts rely on non-financial information to improve the
accuracy of their forecasts [23]. Asset managers use an ESG criteria to sort in and sort out companies
from their portfolios. There is now more than $30 trillion that is globally invested in sustainable
ways [24].
There is, then, an increasing demand of reliable and accurate ESG scores. Indeed, the construction
of sustainability scores poses several controversial issues that relate to the complexity of the term
sustainability, the choice of criteria, their measurement using scores, and how to judge whether
the criteria have been met [25,26]. There is evidence that ESG ratings tend to diverge across rating
agencies [27–31]. Measurement divergence—i.e., the situation where rating agencies measure the same
characteristic using different indicators—seems to account for the largest part of the discrepancy [32].
It is of no surprise, then, that rating agencies are subject to criticism [5,33–35].
ESG raters may adopt different definitions of ESG performance or they may measure the same
item in different ways; however, they primarily base their analyses on non-financial information
released by companies. Nearly every company now issues some form of sustainability reporting.
While financial reporting is by now highly regulated and standardized, there are no legally binding
standards for sustainability disclosure. A few initiatives have been launched to push the development
of more rigorous and systematic reporting of non-financial information [36]; however, mandatory
reporting is still lacking.
A voluntary regulatory environment has its drawbacks, as it provides incentives to companies to
engage in some forms of greenwashing [37]. There is actually evidence that firms tend to overstate
beneficial private information to create a misleadingly positive public impression [38–41]. This can
undermine confidence in sustainability reporting and in the reliability of ESG scores.
The credibility gap in non-financial disclosure has consequently increased the demand from
companies of third-party assurance over their sustainability reports [7–10]. This relies on the shared
view that information is more credible if it has been subjected to independent examination by an
auditor. Prior work has shown that the provision of assurance can increase stakeholders’ perceptions
of the reliability of the sustainability report [42–46]; however, there is no evidence, to our knowledge,
about the usefulness of audit in the improvement of ESG rating scores. Not only is third-party ESG
assurance a voluntary decision, but it also comes with a cost that is arguably born when there is
an expectation of benefits outweighing the costs [9]. Benefits may come in the form of increased
market participants’ confidence in a company’s non-financial reports and in ESG rating scores that
build on those reports. Indeed, auditors are called to play a role in detecting and preventing the
misrepresentation of information and may also be valuable at uncovering misbehavior in organizations.
Corporate scandals attract media attention that can be critical in forming the public’s perception
on the corporation’s ESG activities and scores [47–49] and also place the firm under the investors’
attention [50].
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The resulting damaging exposure can adversely affect corporate reputation [51,52] and also
negatively impact investors and the wellbeing of other stakeholders [14,53,54]. For example, Krüger [14]
studied how the stock market processes negative information regarding a firm’s stakeholder policies and
found that investors have strong negative responses to unfavorable ESG news. Oikonomou et al. [53]
found that corporate misbehavior increases a firm’s financial risk.
Therefore, information on bribery, tax evasion, fraud, and abusive working conditions represents
an economic shock that usually comes as a surprise and that can be used as a quasi-experiment
to detect the reliability of ESG assessments. If rating agencies are effective at valuing corporate
strategies and policies on ESG issues, they are unlikely to downwardly adjust a firm’s ESG score
after a scandal becomes public news [12]. In other words, ESG raters contribute to the reputation of
the firm before misconduct is detected and a reliable assessment reveals that the firm can adjust its
policies and strategies to overcome the adverse impact of bad news, restoring their reputation [12,55].
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). After a scandal has become public news, the ESG scores do not decrease.
In addition, a company that has its reporting audited by a third party who scrutinizes its policies
and strategies is likely to experience less or no downward adjustments of its ESG scores at the
unveiling of corporate scandals. In other words, stakeholders tend to hold a company less responsible
for a scandal when it has more reliable ratings because underlying information is of better quality.
This allows us to state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). After a scandal has become public news, the ESG scores of companies whose reports are
audited do not decrease.
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. The Sample
To test our assumptions, we collected a database combining different data sources.
From Lexis–Nexis, we derived information about corporate scandals of listed companies. We relied
on Thomson–Eikon for information on ESG scores and Datastream/Worldscope for companies’
financial data.
Thomson–Eikon, which has provided ESG ratings for more than 5000 listed companies since 2002,
is a data provider that has been used in previous literature: e.g., [12,13,56–59]. ESG assessments are
based mainly on three publicly available sources: ESG reports of the company, non-governmental
organizations’ (NGO) website, and reliable media channels. A total of 750 data points for ESG aspects
were grouped into 18 categories. From each category, the ESG score ranged from 0 to 100, where the
higher score was associated with the higher level of firm sustainability.
According to previous literature [47], corporate scandals can be defined as widely publicized
incidents involving allegations of managerial wrongdoing or the unethical behavior of one or more
members of the company. In Lexis–Nexis, we searched for news on corporate scandals and required
that each company accused of wrongdoing was rated by Thomson–Eikon. The first scandal that
matched with the ESG score occurred in 2007, so our sample extended over the period of 2007–2017 and
consisted of 71 scandals in 54 companies. Corporate scandals can be grouped into four main categories:
ecological disasters, human rights abuse, product recall, and corporate crime [12]. Ecological disasters
are related to the environmental sustainability of the company (E), human rights abuse and product
recall to the social sustainability of the company (S), and, lastly, corporate crime is usually connected to
the corporate governance (G). Table 1 shows the list of 71 scandals involving 54 listed companies for
the period 2007–2017.
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Table 1. List of Scandals.
Company Country Year Description
Apple US 2010 Abusive working conditions
Apple US 2012 Child labor
Apple US 2013 Child labor
Apple US 2016 Child labor and abusive working conditions
Apple US 2017 Batterygate
BAE Systems UK 2007 Bribery
BAE Systems UK 2009 Bribery
Barclays UK 2012 Libor manipulation
BASF DE 2016 Aggressive tax strategies (tax avoidance)
Baxter US 2007 Child labor
Bilfinger Berger DE 2015 Bribery
Boeing US 2017 Falsifying inspection data
BP UK 2010 Oil spill
Chevron US 2011 Oil spill
Citigroup US 2012 Libor manipulation
Credit Suisse CH 2012 Libor manipulation
Credit Suisse CH 2012 Tax evasion
Credit Suisse CH 2014 Tax evasion
Credit Suisse CH 2017 Tax evasion and money laundering
Daimler DE 2010 Bribery
Deutsche Bank DE 2012 Libor manipulation
Deutsche Bank DE 2012 Tax evasion, trading of emissions certificates
EDF FR 2008 Oil spill
EDF FR 2009 Spying on Greenpeace
Exxon US 2013 Oil spill
Foxconn TW 2010 Abusive working conditions
Foxconn TW 2012 Child labor
GAP US 2007 Child labor
General Motors US 2014 Recall, safety problems
Glaxosmithkline UK 2012 Aggressive marketing and the selective use of data
Glaxosmithkline UK 2013 Bribery of doctors to prescribe drugs
Honda JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
HP US 2010 Abusive working conditions
HSBC UK 2012 Libor manipulation
IHI JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
JP Morgan US 2012 Libor manipulation
JP Morgan US 2012 Deception of risks of high derivatives
Kobe Steel JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
Lloyds UK 2012 Libor manipulation
MAN DE 2009 Failing to prevent bribery
Mattel US 2007 Tox recall, toxic paint
Mazda JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
Microsoft US 2010 Child labor and bad working conditions
Mitsubishi H. Industries JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
Nestle CH 2007 Chinese milk scandal
Nissan JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
Novartis CH 2014 Illegal marketing practices
Olympus Corporation JP 2011 Fraud
Pegatron TW 2013 Abusive working conditions
Pfizer US 2007 Unauthorized drug testing on children in Nigeria
Philip Morris US 2010 Abusive working conditions
RBS UK 2012 Libor manipulation
Samsung KR 2012 Child labor and abusive working conditions
Samsung KR 2016 Recall, product safety
Societe Generale FR 2008 Fraud
Societe Generale FR 2012 Libor manipulation
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Table 1. Cont.
Company Country Year Description
Subaru JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
Telia Company SE 2012 Corruption
Tokyo Electric Power JP 2011 Nuclear disaster
Toyota JP 2009 Recall, unintended acceleration problem
Toyota JP 2017 Falsifying inspection data
Transocean CH 2010 Oil spill
Transocean CH 2011 Oil spill
UBS CH 2009 Tax evasion
UBS CH 2012 Libor manipulation
Unilever UK 2007 Chinese milk scandal
Vale BR 2015 Oil spill
Volksvagen DE 2015 Dieselgate
Walmart US 2012 Hindered safety effort
Walmart US 2012 Bribery
Wells Fargo US 2012 Fraud
Wells Fargo US 2016 Fraud
After the corporate scandal identification, we derived companies’ ESG and financial data in an
event window from the year before and the year after the scandal. The final sample consisted of 71
scandals in 54 companies with complete ESG and financial information.
Distinguishing by industry, 17 scandals were related to the financial industry (24%), 12 to the
automotive (17%), five to the oil and gas industry (7%), five to the chemical industry (7%), and 32
to other industry sectors (45%). As for the country of origin, 21 scandals involved US companies
(30%), 13 Japanese companies (18%), 12 UK companies (17%), nine Swiss companies (13%), six German
companies (8%), four French companies (6%), two Taiwanese companies (3%), two Korean companies
(3%), and one Brazilian company (1%). The majority of these scandals occurred in 2012 (17, 24% of the
total), 11 in 2017 (15%), and seven in 2010 and 2009 (10%).
We also considered the scores related to the E/S/G pillars, collecting them for each company of our
dataset. Table 2 displays the distribution of scandals by industry and ESG pillar. This table shows the
scandal distribution by industry and ESG pillar.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Industry Environmental Social Governance
Automotive 3 21 8
Chemical 4 1 0
Oil and Gas 1 4 1
Financial 0 11 8
Others 0 4 6
Total 8 40 23
% 11.27% 56.34% 32.39%
A total of 40 scandals were related to social issues (S), 23 to governance problems, and eight to
environmental issues.
Thomson–Eikon also provided information about the controversies. The controversy score reflected
the media coverage of past negative events that gave a firm the investors’ attention [50]. This kind of
news damages firms’ reputation and raises questions about future profitability, thus, increasing the
riskiness of the business. ESG controversies were classified into 31 categories that have been recoded
into the ESG traditional pillars. For example, environmental controversies involved spills and pollution
or biodiversity. Social controversies were related to child labor, product quality, and health and safety.
Governance controversies arose because of bribery, insider dealings, or excess compensation. Given its
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impact of the market value of the company [13], controversies played a key role in assessing firms’
sustainability. Thomson–Eikon provided an ESG combined score that incorporated the impact of
controversies on the ESG Score. We collected the ESG combined score for the companies of our database.
Furthermore, Thomson–Eikon disclosed information about the presence of an external auditor for
each ESG report release. Thus, we checked if the internal source of ESG data had been audited or not
and added this information to our database.
Lastly, we derived the financial variables of the companies from Worldscope. Table 3 contains
a description of these variables.
Table 3. List of Controls.
Variable Description
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (WC02999)
Leverage Total debt (WC03255) divided by total assets (WC02999)
Return on Assets Return on assets (WC08326)
Book to Market ratio (BTM) Common shareholders’ equity (WC03501) divided bymarket value of equity (MV)
The control variables used in the paper are described in this table. The source is
Datastream/Worldscope and mnemonics are in parentheses.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Looking at the financial data for the year of the scandal, the companies of our sample were large
cap, with an average leverage level of 25%, an average profitability (ROA) of around 5%, and an average
book-to-market ratio of 0.89. Panel B of Table 4 displays these data.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Rating Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A
ESG Score 71 73.33 B+ 12.54 11.44 91.54
ESG Combined Score 71 43.37 C+ 12.11 7.16 82.68
E 71 76.79 A− 15.08 8.97 97.28
S 71 76.05 A− 16.16 6.59 95.29
G 71 66.30 B 17.31 19.85 92.16
Panel B
Size 71 18.56 16.70 14.90 21.42
Leverage 71 0.2471 0.1380 − 0.6237
ROA 71 0.0525 0.0754 −0.1482 0.2304
BTM 71 0.8944 0.8354 0.0330 5.2982
ESG scores at time t (the year of the scandal) are summarized in Panel A of the table. Firm size,
leverage, ROA, and book-to-market were the same as those defined in Table 3. These financial variables
at time t (the year of the scandal) are summarized in Panel B of the table.
Summarizing the ESG scores, these companies showed an average ESG Score of 73.35 over 100
and an ESG combined score of 45.47. The impact of the controversies was severe given the wedge
between the two scores. Looking at each ESG pillar, these companies showed, on average, a good
performance on E (77.41) and S (76.38) and a moderate result on G (65.28).
We considered the ESG scores before and after the scandal in order to check if significant adjustment
occurred after the unveiling of a corporate wrongdoing. As Utz [12] pointed out, a good quality ESG
assessment implied non-significant rating adjustments after a scandal. In line with Utz [12], we found
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a strong positive autocorrelation of the ESG scores of our sample (0.82), so the ESG score at time (t-1)
could be considered as the expected ESG score at time (t).
ESGt,i = ESGt−1,i + εi (1)
Equation (1) means that for each company i, the difference between two consecutive ESG scores
is quantifiable in an error term εi. We tested if this error term was significantly different from zero.
The results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
∆ ESG Score 71 0.1214 0.9554 8.0450
∆ ESG Combined Score 71 −1.1422 1.5086 12.7117
∆ E 71 0.6464 1.3644 11.4970
∆ S 71 −0.4280 1.2785 10.7726
∆ G 71 01812 1.1882 10.0122
The table summarizes the differences between ESG rating at time t (the year of the scandal) with
respect to the previous ESG rating at time (t-1), the year before the scandal.
The results showed no statistically significant difference between the ESG scores before and after
the scandals. This confirmed our first hypothesis and revealed the good quality of ESG assessments
for the companies in our sample, but if we distinguished between companies with an audited ESG
report and companies without an audited ESG report, we obtained important differences. Table 6
summarizes these results.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics.
Non-Audit Audit Differences
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Mean
∆ ESG Score 21 −1.6243 50 0.8528 −2.4771
∆ ESG Combined Score 21 −5.5500 ** 50 0.7090 −6.2590 **
∆ E 21 −0.4000 50 1.0860 −1.4860
∆ S 21 −3.3528 * 50 0.8004 −4.1532 *
∆ G 21 −1.0047 50 0.6794 −1.6841
The table summarizes the differences (∆) between ESG scores at year t (the year of the scandal)
with respect to the previous ESG rating at year t-1 (the year before the scandal) distinguishing between
companies with an audit on ESG reports vs. companies without an audit on ESG reports. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Companies without an audited ESG report showed a significant decrease of the ESG combined
score and S score. Moreover, the difference in the differences between the two groups of companies
was statistically significant both for the ESG combined score and S score. We argued that the quality of
the ESG assessment was significantly higher for companies that involved an external auditor in the
ESG report process because these firms showed no significant adjustment after the scandal, in line
with our second hypothesis. This effect is particularly important for the ESG combined score, which
was more sensitive to controversies, and for the S score, since 56% of the scandals (40 over 71) were
related to social issues.
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3.3. The Model
To check whether ESG score adjustment was related to the audit of the ESG report, we controlled
for several factors. We ran the following regression models:
1. ∆ESG Scoret,i = β0 + β1Auditt−1,i + β2Sizet,i + β3 Leveraget,i + β4ROAt,i
+β5BTMt,i + Industry dummies+ Country dummies
+Year dummies+ εi,t
2. ∆ESG Combined Scoret,i = β0 + β1Auditt−1,i + β2Sizet,i + β3 Leveraget,i + β4ROAt,i
+β5BTMt,i + Industry dummies+ Country dummies
+Year dummies+ εi,t
where: ∆ESGt,i is the difference between ESG scores of the company i at year t (the year of the scandal)
with respect to the previous ESG score at year t-1; audit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
ESG report of the company has been audited by an external reviewer, 0 otherwise; size is the natural
logarithm of total assets; leverage is the total financial debt divided by total assets; ROA is the EBITDA
divided by total assets; BTM is the book-to-market ratio.
We ran ordinary least square (OLS) regressions both for ∆ESGt,i Score and for
∆ESGt,i Combined Score as dependent variables. Table 7 shows the main results.
Table 7. ∆ ESG regressions.
(1) (2)
Audit 4.1168 *** 8.5500 ***
[1.7825] [4.1889]
Size −1.1188 −2.1253
[1.3804] [2.4946]
Leverage −0.6486 −0.2801
[0.8280] [1.5090]
ROA −0.1449 −0.5596
[0.2838] [0.4475]
BTM −0.6729 *** −0.7500 **
[0.2598] [0.3796]
Adjusted R-squared 0.6338 0.4356
Observations 71 71
OLS regressions with ∆ ESG score as the dependent variable in model (1) and ∆ ESG combined
score as the dependent variable in model (2). Audit was a dummy variable that took value = 1 if
the ESG report of the company was audited by an external reviewer, and zero otherwise. Firm size,
leverage, ROA, and book-to-market were the same as defined in Table 3. The year, country, and
industry fixed effects were included. Standard errors (in brackets) were clustered by firm. ***, **,
and * indicated significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Audit showed a positive and statistically significant coefficient for both models (1) and (2).
When a scandal occurred, the change of ESG scores was positively associated with the presence of an
audited ESG report. Since this report represented one of the main components of the ESG assessment
made by nonfinancial analysts, it implies that a good quality ESG assessment helps in mitigating the
negative effects of a scandal.
BTM had a negative and statistically significant coefficient for both models (1) and (2).
Companies traded at a discount with respect to the book value obtained a significant decrease
in ESG scores when a scandal occurred.
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We also ran three different OLS regressions for each E/S/G score:
3. ∆Et,i = β0 + β1Auditt−1,i + β2Sizet,i + β3 Leveraget,i + β4ROAt,i + β5BTMt,i+
Industry dummies+ Country dummies+ Year dummies+ εi,t
4. ∆St,i = β0 + β1Auditt−1,i + β2Sizet,i + β3 Leveraget,i + β4ROAt,i + β5BTMt,i+
Industry dummies+ Country dummies+ Year dummies+ εi,t
5. ∆Gt,i = β0 + β1Auditt−1,i + β2Sizet,i + β3 Leveraget,i + β4ROAt,i + β5BTMt,i+
Industry dummies+ Country dummies+ Year dummies+ εi,t
The results are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. ∆ E/S/G regressions.
(3) (4) (5)
Audit 2.6082 5.2170 ** 4.5252
[2.8814] [2.6114] [3.0417]
Size −1.9026 -0.8223 −0.5835
[2.3582] [1.7392] [1.6980]
Leverage −0.2554 −0.9722 −1.0510
[0.1324] [1.1420] [0.8812]
ROA −0.3025 −0.1593 0.0417
[0.3799] [0.3426] [0.3457]
BTM −0.6312 ** −0.7558 −0.6205 **
[0.3082] [0.4617] [0.1986]
Adjusted R-squared 0.4224 0.5994 0.4899
Observations 71 71 71
OLS regressions with ∆ E score as the dependent variable in model (3), ∆ S score as the dependent
variable in model (4), and ∆ G score as the dependent variable in model (5). Audit was a dummy
variable that took value = 1 if the ESG report of the company was audited by an external reviewer, and
zero otherwise. Firm size, leverage, ROA, and book-to-market were the same as defined in Table 2.
Year, country, and industry fixed effects were included. Standard errors (in brackets) were clustered by
firm. ***, **, and * indicated significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Audit had a positive and statistically significant coefficient in model (4). This result was expected,
because the majority of corporate scandals are related to the social pillar (40 over 71). BTM confirmed
its negative impact for both models (3) and (5).
4. Discussion of the Results
Assessing the sustainability of a company is a complicated task. ESG rating agencies have often
been criticized because of their methodology [33,34]. There are several controversial issues that relate
to the complexity of the term sustainability, the choice of criteria, their measurement using scores, and
how to judge whether the criteria have been met [25]. A lack of attention is given to the accuracy,
transparency, and reliability of the information that is at the basis of the scores. The ESG report issued
by a company is the primary source of rating agencies’ information. Its quality is crucial for an accurate
ESG assessment, but non-financial reporting has not reached standardized forms at an international
level [36] and mandatory reporting is still lacking. This problem is particularly severe given the
possible misleading behavior of companies that could be tempted to issue false ESG information to the
public (i.e., green-washing or social-washing phenomenon) [38–40].
The information asymmetry between companies and market participants could be mitigated by
the presence of an external auditor on the ESG report. Companies are already seeking external expertise
to verify their sustainability data voluntarily and the number of these requests raises year after year.
We measured how valuable the auditing of ESG reports is, looking at the ESG scores before and after
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a corporate scandal. Using this shock as a quasi-natural experiment, we observed that companies with
audited ESG reports experience no drop in ESG scores. The auditing process increases the quality of
the ESG assessment. ESG scores can be used by market participants as an information that incorporates
all relevant information about the sustainability of the company. When the ESG report is not submitted
to an external audit, there is a significant change in the ESG scores. This implies that the information
content of the score is not complete and does not incorporate all relevant ESG information.
Without an audit on the ESG report, we documented a drop both in the ESG score and ESG
combined score. This fact means that when an ESG score is obtained using a low-quality source of
data, checking for the controversies is not enough to mitigate the lack of information content.
Looking at the E/S/G scores, the pillar S benefits more of the auditing process. There are several
reasons for that. First of all, the majority of the scandals are related either to human rights abuse
or to product recall, thus, belonging to the S pillar of sustainability. Second, the S pillar is more
complicated to analyze compared to the other pillars—mainly due to environmental factors. The “E”
factor has several important features: it is easier to measure; environmental protection and climate
change take a central stage in societal debate; policymakers and regulators address environmental
issues more clearly. The social factor, instead, is under-investigated: it is more difficult to measure;
it could be politically divisive; it is more complicated for policymakers and regulators to issue the
recommendation on “S.” The importance of an external audit on an ESG report has a significant impact
on S, because it helps to mitigate the measurement difficulties.
The policy implications of our findings are mainly two. First, we demonstrated the importance of
an external audit on companies’ ESG report. Second, pillar S needs a clearer definition following the
international efforts about the taxonomy of pillar E. Increasing the quality of data has key implications
for rating agencies, but also for investors, companies, and researchers. These actions are necessary to
improve the information content of ESG scores.
5. Robustness Checks
We performed two different tests in order to confirm our results. First, since the dependent
variables of our models had a limited range from (−100, +100), we ran Tobit regressions to check the
consistency of the results. Tables 9 and 10 summarize the Tobit regression results.
Tobit regressions with ∆ ESG score as dependent variable in model (1) and ∆ ESG combined score
as dependent variable in model (2). Audit is a dummy variable that takes value = 1 if the ESG report
of the company is audited by an external reviewer, and zero otherwise. Firm size, leverage, ROA,
and book-to-market are the same as defined in Table 3. Year, country, and industry fixed effects are
included. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 9. ∆ ESG regressions.
(1) (2)
Audit 4.2051 *** 8.7653 ***
[1.3994] [3.1524]
Size −1.1613 −2.2289
[1.0463] [1.7856]
Leverage −0.6492 −0.2827
[0.6583] [1.5394]
ROA −0.1481 −0.5773
[0.2241] [0.3501]
BTM −0.6991 *** −0.8137 **
[0.2102] [0.32934]
Pseudo R-squared 0.1469 0.0741
Observations 71 71
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Table 10. ∆ E/S/G regressions.
(3) (4) (5)
Audit 2.8186 5.3227 *** 4.5568
[2.2874] [2.0396] [2.3473]
Size −1.9026 −0.8731 −0.6393
[2.004] [1.3041] [1.2684]
Leverage −0.2411 −0.9722 −1.0422
[0.9942] [0.8968] [0.6969]
ROA −0.3100 −0.1631 0.0570
[0.2898] [0.2654] [0.2973]
BTM −0.6935 ** −0.7872 *** −0.6116 **
[0.3082] [0.3701] [0.1479]
Pseudo R-squared 0.0759 0.1226 0.0905
Observations 71 71 71
Tobit regressions with ∆ E score as the dependent variable in model (3), ∆ S score as the dependent
variable in model (4), and ∆ G score as the dependent variable in model (5). Audit is a dummy variable
that takes value = 1 if the ESG report of the company is audited by an external reviewer, or zero
otherwise. Firm size, leverage, ROA, and book-to-market are the same as defined in Table 2. Year,
country, and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by firm.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
The Tobit regressions substantially confirmed the findings we obtained from the baseline models.
Audit played an important role in mitigating scandals’ effect on ESG score differences. Looking at the
E/S/G pillars, the Tobit regressions confirmed that changes in S score were positively related to the
audit variable. BTM confirmed its negative impact for all the models.
Secondly, we checked if the identity of the auditors played a role in explaining the quality of the
assessment. In fact, we had two different kinds of external reviewers: consulting companies with
sustainability expertise (i.e., KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers) and specialized
auditors. On one hand, we expected that consulting companies with a comprehensive expertise in
both the financial and non-financial field could provide audit services on ESG reports of higher quality;
on the other hand, specialized auditors could dig more on non-financial issues, thus, providing a more
reliable ESG report assessment.
In unreported regressions, we ran both OLS and Tobit models, considering an interaction variable
between audit and specialized auditor variables and we did not find evidence of any differences
between the two groups of auditors.
6. Conclusions
There is a large and growing interest in non-financial information by market participants, and
rating agencies play a major role in assessing the sustainability performance of companies. They analyze
and scrutinize a vast amount of information that ranges from questionnaires to news released by media
channels. However, the primary source of information is company reporting.
ESG disclosure is on a voluntary basis. Despite a few initiatives aiming at harmonizing reporting
standards (like the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines or the
non-financial reporting EU directive), ESG disclosure practices are still subject to variation across
firms. Advocates of the standardization of sustainability disclosure argue that standards would bring
consistency to reporting and allow the comparison of company ESG performance, at least within
sectors. In the absence of this, companies can rely on audit services by external parties to provide
independent assurance that their sustainability reporting is fairly presented.
We relied on the ESG scores released by Thomson–Eikon, a data provider who also has information
about the recourse to auditing practices for non-financial information. Using data on 71 corporate
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scandals that occurred from 2007 to 2017, we were able to provide evidence on the reliability of
ESG scores.
We found that the change in the ESG score before and after a scandal was not significantly affected
by the bad event. However, when we split the sample between audited and non-audited non-financial
statements, we detected that the change in ESG rating was significantly negatively affected by the
controversies only for unaudited reporting. Companies whose report had been audited by external
parties did not exhibit a significant worsening in their rating. The evidence was also confirmed in
a multivariate analysis, where we controlled for firm-specific characteristics.
Therefore, rating agencies provide accurate measures of companies’ sustainability when the
underlying non-financial information is audited. Third-party assurance about the quality of ESG
reporting is thus valuable to investors and other stakeholders who rely on the ESG rating for their
decision making. Our analysis has policy implications, as it adds to the ongoing debate on the ESG
reporting practices and their influence on the quality of companies’ non-financial information. In fact,
regulator efforts are significant in this direction. The Directive 2014/95/EU requires the member states
of the European Union to ensure that the statutory auditor checks for the presence of the information
but does not require an audit of non-financial information. The statutory auditor is not required to
issue an assurance opinion on the non-financial information disclosed, but only a consistency check.
The efforts of the European Commission on this field are very important, and in its guidelines on
non-financial disclosure, it is stated that independent external assurance can be seen as a way to make
information “clearer and accurate.” Our findings go in this direction and document that third-party
external verification enhances the reliability of non-financial reporting, helping to bridge the credibility
gap between the company and the market about sustainability reporting.
7. Limitations
Thomson–Eikon is an important source of data for this paper for several reasons. First, it provides
both the ESG score and ESG combined score, considering the role of controversies in the sustainability
assessment; second, it covers different markets, allowing researchers to build an international dataset;
third, the ESG scores range from zero to 100, giving the dependent variables a minimum level of
variability, which allows us to make some inferences. Nevertheless, ESG data have some limitations.
ESG scores are disclosed on a yearly basis, while a more accurate measure of the impact of a scandal
could be better captured with more granularity of the time series (monthly). ESG data goes back to 2002,
while several important scandals occur before that date (i.e., Exxon Valdez, 1989; Enron, 2001). We could
use another ESG source of data to integrate our database, such as MSCI, which has a longer time series,
but different ESG providers use different methodologies in analyzing companies’ sustainability, so we
could have a problem with the comparability of data from different sources.
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